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Abstract 
There  has been a renewed interest in populism in Latin America, sparked by the social mobilization 
against neoliberalism usually referred to as the 'Pink Tide'.  Governments brought to power by the 'Pink Tide' have 
been successful in reconstructing the conditions of capital accumulation as well as incorporating a new set  of social 
movement demands. This article puts forward an interpretation of ‘Pink Tide neopopulism' based on a political 
economy approach. It argues that the two factors of a crisis of neoliberalism in the region and the existence of social 
movements with unmet demands are not enough to explain the rise and demise of populism.  The commodity boom 
needs to be added as an enabling condition of these transformations. By revisiting the debate in Latin America and 
proposing a different reading the article redefines an overloaded term and provides a new analytical viewpoint from 
which to understand the ‘historical task’ of populism in Brazil and Argentina. 
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Introduction 
In no other region of the world does populism and its debate have such a long and rich 
political and socioeconomic history as in Latin America, even if the rural Russian and North 
American cases preceded it. In the past decade and a half, the coming to office of a series of centre 
left governments (such as Lula in Brazil, the Kirchners in Argentina or Rafael Correa in Ecuador) has 
given new space (and meaning) to the term, both politically and academically.  
This article proposes a reading of the latest wave of populism in Argentina and Brazil that 
stresses its enabling conditions and its historical differences with the classical populism of the post 
World War II period. It argues that the relationship between existing populisms in Latin America and 
modes of capital accumulation is an important and understudied topic. Current debates have 
neglected this aspect in an (over)reaction to the deterministic approaches to populism in the 1960s 
and 1970s literature. The approach used here contributes to revitalizing the agenda on populism that 
is currently dominated by a subfield of political science centred on discourse analysis. 
This article is divided into two main sections. In the first one, the proposed approach is 
situated against other attempts to define populism in Latin America. Then the article focuses on what 
I call ‘Pink Tide neopopulism,’ which is understood as distinct from classical post-war populism and 
also from neoliberal populism. By situating the cases of Kirchnerism in Argentina and Lulism in 
Brazil historically and identifying their specificities and structural traits the perspective offers an 
original reading of them. 
This article has been written during the coming to an end of the ‘Pink Tide’ (the group of 
governments that stem from processes of social mobilization against neoliberalism). Latin America 
‘was the only part of the world where rebellious social movements coexisted with heterodox 
governments’ (Anderson, 2016). Together with the end of the commodity boom this ‘global 
exception’ is closing. An attempt to contribute to understanding this process could not be timelier, for 
the echoes of the question asked by Ianni (1973) (‘why do masses disappear from the political 
scenarios of each country?’) despite the different context, still resonate. 
This study of the enabling conditions of populism, however, is also relevant to explaining 
the demise of populism and not just its rise. The study of the end of populist cycles has been certainly 
neglected, because of the assumption of populism as either a transitional anomaly before a ‘return to 
normal’ (e.g. modernization theory) or as a quasi-universal category equivalent to ‘true democracy’ 
that has thus no specific demise. The approach presented in this article aims to overcome these 
shortcomings. 
Populism as an ‘anomaly of modernization’ 
In Latin American politics, ‘populism’ has been used as a term to describe almost any 
government, including some neoliberal ones of the 1990s. This has been reproduced in the academic 
context making sometimes the analytical value of the concept worthless. Populism has often been 
understood as a predestined trait of Latin American regimes, doomed to be anomalous by nature.1 
Such an essentialized understanding of populism should belong more to the domain of orientalism 
than that of political science. 
There is as well a vast amount of research that responded to the above with a systematic 
development of the concept of populism into a category of greater analytical value. These could be 
broadly clustered in three waves that correspond to different eras of democratic rule in the continent. 
The first one took place in the 1950s and 1960s and was concerned with analysing the 1930s and 
post-war governments of Perón in Argentina, Vargas in Brazil and Cárdenas in Mexico among 
others. A second wave that attempted to develop the concept of ‘neopopulism’ or ‘neoliberal 
populism’ took place in the 1990s and sparked a debate on whether some neoliberal governments 
such as Menem’s in Argentina, Fujimori’s in Perú or Collor de Mello’s in Brazil could be framed 
under the old (but now rejuvenated) category. Finally, recent interest in populism revolved around the 
‘Pink Tide’ of governments arising from social mobilization against neoliberalism in the 2000s such 
as those of Kirchner in Argentina, Lula in Brazil or Chavez in Venezuela. 
The first wave of interpretations of populism in the 1950s and 1960s characterised it as an 
ideological-political phenomenon, revolving around different forms of manipulation of ‘available’ 
and ‘uneducated’ masses by a small section of the elite or a paternalistic caudillo (leader). 
Personalism was opposed to institutionalism; in the political sphere populism signalled 
underdevelopment and backwardness. 
In Argentina this trend was inaugurated by Gino Germani, for whom Peronism (and by 
extension other populisms in Latin America) was an anomalous product of modernisation.2 The 
transition from traditional to modern societies was expected to follow a pattern of growth in mass 
participation according to the West-European ideal-type. This would occur through a slow 
consolidation of representative democracy: progressive reforms and participation in liberal or 
proletarian parties (Germani, 1971). For Germani, this transition in Latin America is upended by the 
emergence of 'degraded' forms of political activity due to the accelerated pace of changes during the 
crisis of 1930. This led to an early mobilisation of masses that clashed with inadequate or backward 
political structures, hence giving rise to a ‘deviation’, i.e. populism. This lack of political institutions 
or other means able to deal with (irrational and inexperienced) mobilised masses explains political 
crisis and the rise of a charismatic leader. These ideas were used by others such as Di Tella (1965) in 
a similar political context but also appropriated by the Left as an explanation for the ‘lack’ of 
proletarian class politics. 
This trend in Brazil is similarly expressed by the first papers of the Grupo de Itatiaia in the 
1950s (see Gomes, 1996), such as those by Hélio Jaguaribe (1968). Populism (mainly Varguismo, 
though also Adhemarismo and Janismo) is understood in the context of the problems of national 
development, as a specific political dimension of the transition from an agrarian export-oriented 
economy to a modern industrial one, where urbanization is the source of (new) masses.3 Francisco 
Weffort, in a similar vein, stressed the limits of the ‘liberal oligarchic regime’4 of the early twentieth 
century and how its crisis led to the construction of a new order, marked by ‘populist manipulation’5 
whereby the state at the same time controls and meets the demands of the new workers (Weffort, 
1968). 
This first group of readings reflected two ideas stemming from the pejorative and common 
sense usage of populism, as highlighted in the introduction to this volume: the ideas of an anomaly to 
the ideal-type of Western European democracy and a charismatic leader. Nevertheless, this first 
attempt at understanding populism provided useful insights as well. It raised (for the first time in 
Latin America at least) the question of the relationship between populism and structural socio-
economic transformations. By identifying unexpected political outcomes of industrialization they 
opened up the question of the relationship and interdependence of these two phenomena. Second, the 
study of populism in this context understood it as a form of the state, whose other expressions 
(populist movements for instance) are subsidiary to it, i.e. the continuation of the populist state by 
other means. Third, as stressed by most commentators (Mackinnon and Petrone, 1998; Viguera, 
1993), this early study of populism identified as the ‘historical task’ of populism the political 
incorporation of mobilized and politically excluded social groups, in the context of rapid changes and 
a crisis of traditional hegemony. These two elements, the institutionalization of conflict 
(underpinning the patronizing and biased idea of populist manipulation) and the background of a 
crisis of representation or governance will be returned to later on.  
This reference to the early theories of populism should also mention the tendency in the late 
1960s and early 1970s to view populism in the context of dependency theory and Marxism. This 
began by defining populism as a socioeconomic project, i.e. the reflection of a specific model of 
accumulation, namely import substitution industrialisation (ISI). The thesis follows a functionalist 
logic: populism exists to fulfil the requirements of a specific mode of accumulation, ISI. As the 
success of ISI depends on state intervention and nationalisation, and this requires a close control of 
social relations by the state and thus the political support of popular sectors, populism becomes the 
political form of this need. Redistributive policies, for instance, are functional both to guaranteeing 
the political support of the masses and to building a stronger internal market (Cardoso and Faletto, 
1969; Vilas, 1988).  
The crude determinism of this position has been widely criticized. Once populism is made 
the political requirement or consequence of ISI, then there could be no ISI without populism. Even a 
cursory overview of the historical record would be enough to prove this wrong. The ubiquity of ISI in 
the periphery (and beyond) in the post-war period was certainly not matched by an equivalent 
universality of ‘populist regimes’. Instead, one could observe everything from other types of welfare 
state/ISI projects to anti-populist dictatorships to variants of conservative governments. If populism is 
nothing but the political expression of ISI, there is no specific issue to address as one could plainly 
refer to ISI: subsuming populism to ISI makes populism redundant as an analytical category. The 
conceptual failure of functionalism is more apparent when one looks harder into specific cases. For 
instance, the dictatorship that overthrew Perón in 1955 was unequivocally committed to putting an 
end to Peronism, though certainly not to ISI, and even took Raul Prebisch from CEPAL as economic 
advisor. The ensuing democratic regime, the government of Arturo Frondizi (1958-1962), also under 
ECLAC’s advice, was set up to expand ‘developmentalist’ projects while strictly repressing many of 
the rights extended by Peronism and attempting to guarantee that wages would be kept ‘competitive’. 
Outside of Latin America examples of non-populist ISI abound. Confusing ISI with the modes of 
domination that were possible under it is plain reductionism. 
The functionalist approach mirrors what was already present in the theories of populism as 
anomalies of modernization. Their shortcomings are thus probably responsible for the complete 
absence of any reference to modes of accumulation or economic determinants of populism thereafter. 
If dependency theory attempted to explain populism as the functional requisite of ISI, modernization 
theory thought it was a distortion, a ‘mass historical disorientation’ due to the ‘premature’ 
incorporation of the masses into political life during late transitions to urban industrialisation. Both 
theories expect a direct correlation between accumulation and social conflict, the former by assuming 
that actually existing populism reflects accumulation needs and the latter by expecting modernization 
to ‘come with’ Western representative democracy and seeing it as an anomaly when it does not. 
Having said that, taken as a whole, the first populist experiences of Latin America emerged under 
common structural and historical configurations. It would therefore be problematic to avoid any 
reference to this common trait in the study of populism, especially when the question of 
accumulation and conflict still has to be theorized anew in non-linear and non-deterministic ways 
(Duarte and Fontes, 2013; Grigera, 2013). 
In rejoining some elements of this debate we propose below to view ISI as the enabling 
condition of classical Latin American populism. First, following Zavaleta Mercado (1986; recently 
rejoined by Piva, 2013) there is an implicit assumption that the state has the capacity to redistribute. 
Zavaleta understands that the crisis of the masses needs to be matched with the institutional capacity 
of the state to respond, i.e. to institutionalize, integrate and redistribute. Now, it is crucial not to 
naturalize the state capacity to capture and redistribute resources, an analogous functionalist logic to 
the approach above and yet commonplace in the contemporary literature. In the case of post-war 
populisms, these new resources are to be found in world market transformations and Latin American 
integration to it, that is to say ISI. 
The classical literature summarized to some extent the idea of the enabling condition by 
stating that ‘the secret of populism is ISI’ (Plá, 1991; Viguera, 1993) and understood that populism 
was not possible after its end (as rightly noted by Knight, 1998). Córdova (1972) suggested yet 
another connection between populism and ISI: that of the ‘myth of industrialization’. 
Industrialization operated as the project that ‘pacifies everything and solves everything’, as a 
common horizon of social transformation that would improve everyone’s living condition. ‘Myth’ in 
this context should be understood after Barthes (1999), i.e. as a second order semiological system 
where a term is charged with a (politically relevant) connoted meaning. The myth of industrialization 
in other words does not refer to a farcical nature of industrialization but rather to the idea that ISI will 
bring welfare to the people, national development and a bright future. In sum, ISI enables not only 
the resources but also the construction of the myth of industrialization. 
To summarise, the debate on postwar populism has tainted with determinism the question of 
the relationship between populism and modes of accumulation. In what follows, we propose to bring 
this issue back in the agenda by rethinking both the role of state redistribution and the conditions of 
the emergence and demise of populism. 
Populism beyond the classical canon: the Pink Tide 
After a short-lived attempt at reframing the concept of populism as ‘neopopulism’ or 
‘neoliberal populism’ on the thin grounds of a ‘political style’ (Knight, 1998) and the profile of its 
voters in the 1990s, the academic literature on Latin America returned to populism in the beginning 
of the 21st century with the so-called ‘Pink Tide’. This return is again accompanied by a common-
sense usage of populism as demagoguery and authoritarianism, but also with a substantive theoretical 
renewal.  
The return of populism to the contemporary agenda is dominated by comparisons with and 
revisits of ‘classical’ (i.e. post-war) populism, thus inscribing Pink-Tide neopopulisms within this 
specific genealogy. This is partly the reason why neopopulism as in ‘neoliberal populism’ has 
become a historical curiosity, without any significant conceptual legacy. Neoliberal populism was 
framed as ‘attempting a marriage of populism and neoliberalism’ (Knight, 1998) and was used for 
cases such as Carlos Menem in Argentina and Alan Garcia or Alberto Fujimori in Peru. These 
governments were seen as populist because even when implementing Washington Consensus 
reforms, their ‘political style’ included an appeal to the people, nationalism and promises of 
redistribution. Even by the quite encompassing definition of Laclau (2005) however, these 
governments never systematically attempted an incorporation of democratic demands nor their 
articulation as a division between ‘the people’ (weak, oppressed, exploited) and its enemies. For 
instance, in the case of Menem, the term ‘populist’ was applied because of his ‘charismatic character’ 
and the tradition of the Peronist party to which he belonged (Palermo and Novaro, 1996). However, 
most analyses of his discourse identify a dominant use of liberal references, or stress its continuity 
with previous (non-populist) governments (Barros, 2005).  
The main novelty in the past decade and a half has come from the works of Laclau, who 
proposes to understand populism as a formal political logic of constitution of identities. The ‘logic of 
equivalence’ divides society in two antagonistic fields, one of which is usually the ‘people’ that 
claims itself as the totality and is ultimately an empty signifier, while the ‘other’ exploits, oppresses, 
makes ‘the people’ suffer. Populism arises as the constitution of the former, as a subject that is able 
to absorb democratic demands. Populism for Laclau can be applied to varied phenomena from 
Maoism to Nazism, even some neoconservative governments (Laclau, 2005). This theoretical 
renewal has been key in saving the concept from ‘condescension due to a waning error’, though the 
review above shows that it was far from the first attempt to provide ‘an alternative to liberal 
definitions’ (Bray, 2015).  
At the same time, alongside the widespread usage of Laclau’s approach, there is growing 
discomfort with its limitation to a descriptive level: populism seems to be a political form, an 
antagonistic appeal of the people that underpins modern, representative democracy (Bray, 2015). 
This formalistic approach to populism makes the phenomenon conceptually almost universally 
possible, or at least each time there are unmet democratic demands (and, as Panizza (2005) notes, this 
implies that politically mobilized actors are being rejected by the political system). The existence of 
unmet demands thus ‘opens the space for populism’ (Panizza, 2016) or is the ‘condition for the 
emergence’ of populism (Laclau, 2005). In other words, the only enabling condition of populism is a 
crisis of representation, i.e. the inability of the democratic system to represent ‘the people’.  
Thus there seems to be an identity between populism and politics or democracy, for it seems 
difficult to distinguish between them but for a certain fetishization of ‘the people’ (already present in 
demos of democracy) and an ex-post identification of ‘unmet demands’. Ultimately, both the enabling 
condition and the phenomenon end up being too generic, for unmet demands are a constant trait of 
almost every political system. Furthermore, this approach does not distinguish populist movements 
from populism in power or ruling populism, and thus obfuscates the issue of how and under what 
conditions the former can become the latter. Even more, without a careful examination it can lead to 
a functionalist logic (see above the point by Zavaleta: the existence of demands does not guarantee 
the state’s capacity to redistribute). 
Likewise, ‘emergence’ is a concept different from enabling condition. For the crisis of 
representation is only able to explain the ‘founding moment’ of a populist regime, but it does not 
address why these regimes (or movements) come to an end. The implicit supposition is that, once 
present, populism will live for a while and not necessarily dissipate when the unmet demands are met 
or new ones arise. In other words, unmet demands are too generic to explain the emergence of 
populism and unable to explain its demise or its dynamics. Structuring the question around an ‘empty 
signifier’ (a redundancy, since signifiers are empty by definition) misses the manifold relations 
between social practices and discourse, emptying the understanding of the former, or in other words 
emptying politics. 
Are there any continuities to be found in such a long trajectory of the concept of populism? 
In a roundabout manner, there is a persistent focus on issues that, if addressed conceptually can lead 
to a better understanding of Pink Tide neopopulism. Specifically, the litany of media stereotypes that 
‘populism, in essence, combines two lethal evils: disregard of the institutions of democracy and 
economic irresponsibility’6 while misguided and non-rigorous, point towards two topics that have 
been present in most of the approaches to populism: institutions and economic redistribution. These, 
together with the conditions of emergence will be the key elements in analysing the neopopulist 
regimes of Brazil and Argentina after 2000.  
First, populist regimes are key to (re)institutionalizing social conflict. Some theories 
understood populism as a factor of disintegration of institutionalized forms of political representation. 
Both modernization theories and Laclau underlined the crisis of traditional political institutions 
(either their inadequacy in a moment of transition or their increasing inability to absorb a chain of 
demands), in a way that has sometimes been understood as the emergence of forms of non-
institutionalized political representation, e.g. a populist leader who makes institutions obsolete. On 
the other hand, structuralist approaches understood populism as the ‘political expression’ of ISI and 
pointed out that capital accumulation requires a tighter state control of social relations, thus seeing 
populism as a form of institutionalization and a broadening of citizenship (e.g. labour rights during 
Perón or Vargas). Despite this apparent disagreement, each of these theories emphasizes different 
moments and captures different aspects of populism. While the former looks at the conditions of 
emergence of populism where institutions are actively challenged, the latter insists on its structural 
traits, that is to say the long-term effect of the regime. By looking at the dynamics of populism a 
more nuanced picture can be constructed: the creation of new representations is not to be confused 
with the disappearance of institutions. The claim of the leader that ‘the people’ can come directly to 
him/her is the expression and signalling of the ongoing institutional transformations and the attempt 
at being identified with the new institutional channels. In sum, after a first stage of institutional 
disruption the direction of populism is towards institutionalizing social conflict, to the extent that one 
could probably understand that the historical task of populism is institutionalizing social conflict (a 
perspective not far from Laclau’s idea of incorporation of demands as populism’s implicit objective). 
Second, we should consider the question of the availability of resources for the state to 
capture and redistribute. While most definitions of populism-as-evil highlight ‘economic 
irresponsibility’ (a very broad condemnation of any state expenditure beyond the neoliberal canon, 
e.g. (Dornbusch and Stedwards 2007)),7 it is true that some sort of redistribution has been key to 
almost all Latin American populisms.8 Redistribution is present as a feature of populism in most 
analyses (apart from those stemming from Laclau) although it is frequently noted as a by-product of 
some sort of clientelist politics (i.e. to build political support). In structuralist analyses, redistributive 
policies are also interpreted as functional to ISI’s need of a stronger internal market.  
However, we should note two less well represented elements: first redistribution as a 
consequence of the relative power of a social group, that is to say the satisfaction of a demand in its 
own right and not as a functional product of clientelism nor national development. Second, as already 
noted by Zavaleta above, redistribution presupposes the existence of (new) resources to be 
appropriated by the state. In sum, the widely mentioned issue of redistribution under populism should 
be framed under the enabling condition of available resources, not as pork barrel politics but rather as 
a reinstatement of the state as a mediator capable of arbitration of social conflict. In other words in 
the populist redistribution what is at stake is state power as a mediator, its capacity to institutionalize 
redistributive conflicts.9 
Finally, a crisis of representation as a condition of emergence of populism is another 
common theme in the literature (Mackinnon and Petrone, 1998). From Germani’s (1971) idea that 
there were groups with ‘excess’ of demands, to Laclau’s (2005) chain of equivalence, there is hardly 
any aspect more widely discussed. The specific nature of this crisis, the social groups in question and 
their mobilisation capacity will give shape to the populist regime. 
In what follows, we will assess Pink Tide neopopulism in Argentina and Brazil by paying 
attention to their enabling condition, that is to say to the crisis of representation and the availability of 
redistributable resources that allow for the (re)institutionalisation of social conflict and the 
reinstatement of state power as a mediator. 
Argentina’s Kirchnerism: 2001 and Commodity Boom 
The outbreak of the largest crisis in recent Argentine history in 2001-2002 marked the 
turning point for a country that used to be ‘the poster boy’ of Washington consensus policies. It 
opened a long period of turmoil (including defaulting on foreign debt and the expropriation of bank 
savings in foreign currency) and a crisis of governance signalled by the symptomatic call ‘Que se 
vayan todos’ (Out with them all!) and the succession of five presidents in a month. The political and 
economic bankruptcy of neoliberal policies meant the opening of a new fluid equilibrium that lasted 
until 2015. This was inaugurated by two politicians from the Peronist tradition (Rodriguez Saa and 
Duhalde) followed by Nestor Kirchner (elected in 2003) and Cristina Fernandez (elected in 2007 and 
2011). The period after the crisis has been repeatedly studied under Laclau’s paradigm seeing the 
Kirchners as a phenomenon that posed a new re-articulation of hegemony built on an antagonism of 
the people against foreign capital, the concentrated groups or the ‘anti-patria’ (anti-patriotic) 
newspaper Clarin (among others Aboy Carlés, 2003; Panizza, 2016). 
As previously argued, this formal/discursive dimension of populism does not allow to 
account for the differences between post-war populism and Pink Tide neopopulism. Classical 
populism (the first Peronism) constituted a response to the crisis of the ‘infamous decade’10 and the 
growth of working class demands in the new economic context of the post-war. Thus, Peronism gave 
citizenship to the working class, i.e. carried out a state restructuring that would install institutional 
mediation of labour/capital conflict. This institutionalizing of the working class movement through 
the legalization of trade unionism (alongside a demarcation of ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ union 
practices and tendencies) was also accompanied by a redistribution of income in the form of wage 
social security, i.e. the specific form of citizenship was tied to job rights.  
Pink Tide neopopulism differs in several key respects from this model. First is the specific 
context of a structural crisis. Neopopulism is the response to the political crisis created by the 
opposition to neoliberalism by different social movements, whose cycle of struggle began in 1996: 
unemployed workers (piqueteros), public sector unions, human right movements and after 2001 
asambleas (assemblies) and recuperated factories (Grigera, 2006). The incorporation of demands 
follows manifold paths, as Piva (2015) rightly summarizes: the state responds to unemployed 
workers’ demand of jobs and workfare (while ‘tough piqueteros’, are delegitimized, see Svampa and 
Pereyra, 2004), demands of justice on human rights violations from the last dictatorship are 
recognized and judicialized, trade unions are ‘revitalized’, i.e. recover some power of mediation of 
capital/labour relationships in a context of enormous growth of employment (mostly informal) and a 
record number of collective bargain agreements (Atzeni and Ghigliani, 2008).  
The ‘myth of industrialization’ is used by Kirchnerism in a farcical way, appealing to the 
memory of the glorious past of post-war ISI, together with a discourse of ‘reindustrialization’ whose 
only empirical ground is economic recovery. The form of the state is reconfigured, downgrading the 
ministry of finance that used to be effectively autonomous and on top of all powers after neoliberal 
reforms (Bonnet and Piva, 2013). Also, different social movements are incorporated as civil servants 
and functionaries as a way of institutionalizing demands but also shaping a differential access to the 
state within mobilized social groups (thus effectively ‘dividing and conquering’). In sum, the 
recomposition of governance was articulated through direct redistribution, indirect redistribution 
thanks to changes in the mode of accumulation and with the institutionalization of demands. 
As outlined above, the intertwined processes of institutionalization and redistribution are 
articulated by the state capacity to use and capture resources. Unlike classical populism, ISI is 
certainly not the structural condition allowing the existence of state appropriable surplus. Pink Tide 
neopopulism is founded rather on a more modest set of changes: a large devaluation in 2002/3 that 
allowed for the modest substitution of some imports, the foreign debt default that freed an important 
share of the national budget from interest repayments (Piva, 2013) and most importantly the 
commodity boom cycle. This last element has been repeatedly outlined as central to the 
understanding of the Pink Tide’s (limited) redistribution, and sometimes in a deterministic fashion of 
the Pink Tide tout court (Weyland 2009). These changes in capital accumulation made the populist 
response to the crisis possible, thus enabling the articulation of a process of institutionalization of 
social conflict.  
The commodity prices skyrocketed during 2002–11 in a region heavily dependent on 
exports of primary commodities. In Argentina they accounted for 70% of the exports during this 
period (UN comtrade) where the country’s terms of trade improved 68% and its total exports of 
primary products grew in current prices 300% (CEPALSTAT). One indicator of the political 
importance of commodity exports during the post-2001 crisis period is the conflicts around export 
tariffs (retenciones a las exportaciones). In 2008, after the government’s attempt at reforming the 
export tariff to allow for automatically adjustable rates (pegged to each commodity’s international 
price) the country went into the largest agricultural lock out in decades. The end of exceptional 
international conditions for Argentinian primary commodities after 2012 has re-opened the 
distributive question, first marked by the end of primary fiscal surplus. If Pink Tide neopopulism is to 
be understood beyond the discursive apparatus, a closer look at the political economy of these 
resources is necessary, especially in light of the temporal coincidence with the closure of the 
neopopulist cycle. 
There are as well a number of elements that are specific to Pink Tide neopopulism that 
distinguishes it from post-war populism. First, there is a change in the mobilised subject and in the 
nature of ‘citizenship’. If it was the working class under Peronism, a different set of social 
movements and the urban poor are the ones that are given space under Kirchnerism (Wylde, 2012). 
Then, the nature of the process of incorporation of social groups to institutionalized democracy is 
conditioned by a history that is reproduced and re-signified. In other words, that ‘primitive 
incorporation’ (Peronism) is politically used by Kirchnerism (Piva 2014). And finally, the nature of 
the institutionalization of this neopopulism is strikingly different to the universal citizenship of the 
welfare state. Kirchnerism has produced a fragmented citizenship in two regards. First, a deepening 
of the dualization of the labour market. Despite an enormous growth of employment during these 
years, ‘informal’ (non-registered) jobs dominated, alongside a growth in wage disparity, thus 
widening the gap of fragmentations in a social welfare traditionally structured as a set of rights 
associated with a formal job. In the terrain of a social safety net, neopopulism has chosen to structure 
social expenditure around Conditional Cash Transfers that are by definition focused and a 
commodified and financialised approach to welfare (Lavinas, 2013). 
To summarize, Kirchnerism showcases the key elements common to populism outlined in 
our first sections. Stemming as a response to a crisis of representation, it sets out to institutionalise 
those conflicts, through indirect and direct redistribution, enabled by the unique economic recovery 
made possible by devaluation and a commodity boom. The latter was key to allow for state 
appropriation of resources through export tariffs, a sensitive political issue throughout the period. The 
demise of the enabling condition meant the end of this populist cycle for Argentina. 
Lula’s Brazil: ‘I am not a populist’ 
In Brazil ‘the era of populism’ began with the economic crisis of 1930s (together with the 
end of República Velha through a military coup)11 and ended in 1964. This widespread agreement on 
a period delimited by coups d’état speaks as well of the assumption that populism is pervasive and 
possible without democratic rule (i.e. considering the possibility of a populist dictatorship). The 
military coup of 1930 embodies the paradox of a dictatorship attempting to democratize the state and 
the entry of popular masses into politics (somewhat similar to the coup of 1943 in Argentina that lead 
to Peronism). 
The main characteristics of populism outlined above are also valid for the Vargas era. The 
rapid transformation of the form of the state implies an institutional widening of its social base. A 
first dimension is that of democratization from above. Besides outlining the basis for ISI, Vargas 
introduces the largest change in capital/labour relations of the century. This is mainly in the form of 
expanding rights for urban labour (i.e. manufacturing and services), thus large landowner interests are 
not immediately affected. As in Argentina the incorporation of masses to the Brazilian democracy - 
giving them ‘citizenship’ - is done through labour rights. In other words, the state appears to citizens, 
and is constituted as a mediator of social relationships at the level of capital-labour relations. 
Now, as much as Vargas’ populism has been traditionally included within the cases of post-
war populism in Latin America, whether Lula should be understood in the context of Pink Tide 
neopopulism is an issue of contention. Lula came to office in 2002, the fourth election since the end 
of the military dictatorship in 1985. Since the campaign Lula’s discourse avoided the construction of 
an antagonism between the people and others, and in his ‘Carta ao Povo Brasileiro’ (Letter to the 
Brazilian People, June 2002),12 Lula’s electoral ‘love letter’ to the business community, he made a 
commitment to market economy, macroeconomic stability, the control of inflation and fiscal 
equilibrium, while still mentioning the need to reduce poverty and inequality. The letter not only 
signalled continuity with the neoliberal order, but also codified one of Lula’s many gestures of 
differentiation from Varguism. 
Despite Lula’s explicit disavowal of populism, the term has been thrown at his government 
and him repeatedly, usually with weak arguments. For instance, it has been grounded in support from 
the poor, after a shift of the electoral base to poorer sections of the voters in the 2006 election. 
Bethell (2013) is right to point out that ‘his success with the poorer sections of society was not, 
however, the result of a typically polarizing anti-elite, anti-globalisation, anti-American populist 
discourse’, so that ‘it remained difficult therefore to describe Lula as a neo-populist of the Left’. Or it 
has been argued that Lula is a populist after his charismatic appeal or his clientelistic networks, or on 
his appeals to ‘the people’ in some discourses.  
Still, in order to usefully characterize the ruling PT, proving the existence of appeals to ‘the 
people’ and polarization is not enough, nor do these give a sense of how it relates to previous 
populisms in Brazil and to other contemporary neopopulisms in Latin America. In Brazil, the 
strongest attempt at characterizing the PT or ‘lulismo’ was not done following Laclau but rather a 
liberal understanding of populism. For instance, Cardoso and his followers characterized Lula as a 
populist on the grounds that he is a charismatic leader who ‘purchases the favour of the masses with 
charity and flattery’ (Anderson 2011) and for being a ‘budgetary populist’, thus Lula embodies the 
‘most regressive traditions of the continent’. However, despite its impact on media, this reading is 
marginal in academic studies. 
The main lines of academic analysis of Lula’s government begin in 2003 with Chico de 
Oliveira (2003) and span to André Singer (2012). They include a number of varied explanations 
ranging from classical sociology, Gramscianism and Bonapartism to theories of electoral 
realignment. Even though they do not agree to in framing Lulism as neopopulism, they do mention a 
number of elements that are common to what we have identified as its characterization. 
First of all, there is an overwhelming consensus that the PT in power was a strong force of 
demobilisation, through the institutionalization of some demands and also through the incorporation 
of social movements’ personnel to the state. Oliveira (2003) states that this demobilisation is a 
product of the alignment of the interests of PT and trade union officials with financial interests 
through their increasing dependence on public funds and financialised pension funds. For him this 
was part of a process of ‘kidnapping of social movements’ (mainly the MST)13 by the state. Sallum 
Jr. (2004) sees a ‘liberal-developmentalist’ turn that implies strong state intervention. Werneck 
Vianna (2007) understands Lula as someone who de-politicized social conflict. Singer (2012) sees in 
the realignment of the electoral base of Lula towards the ‘sub-proletariat’ the main drive towards 
peaceful resolution of social conflict, as a demand of this class that is both hoping for the state to 
decrease inequality and afraid of disorder and conflict created from social movements. In sum, 
behind different causal explanations of why institutionalization takes place we find a strong 
agreement that ‘the signature of his rule was, if anything, demobilisation’ (Anderson, 2011), or in 
Singer’s words the ‘pasteurization’ of social mobilization.  
A second element in most analyses of Lulism is that of redistribution or the limited nature of 
it, somewhat reflected in Lula’s statement that ‘it’s cheap and easy to look after the poor’.14 The triad 
of Bolsa Família (a large CCT program), crédito consignado (consumer credit), university quotas 
and increases to the minimum wage have become trademarks of PT rule, a sort of motto, repeated on 
many occasions. As Anderson (2013) has noted ‘[n]o less important has been the symbolic message 
it delivers: that the state cares for the lot of every Brazilian, no matter how wretched or downtrodden, 
as citizens with social rights in their country.’ However, following our analysis above for CCTs 
under Kirchnerism, these rights are closer to a ‘fragmented citizenship’ than to the model of post-war 
populism. The impact of the commodity boom on Brazil is also important: the share of primary 
products in exports went from 40% to 55% between 2000 and 2012 and they grew in value terms 
seven times (CEPALSTAT). Even when redistribution is limited in its amount (and as repeatedly 
noted it was not done at the cost of the rich), it is one of the political axes of PT’s rule. 
The limited nature of its redistributive policies, the effectiveness at demobilising and the 
timid use of antagonistic discourse when compared to other governments of the Pink Tide (such as 
Venezuela’s, but also Kirchnerism as analysed above) makes Lulism seem like a ‘less intense’ form 
of neopopulism. With a similar integration to the world market as other countries of the region, 
Lulism was able to profit from the commodity boom by raising taxes from it. However, the 
specificity of Brazil lays in the fact that the resistance to neoliberalism was not as strong as 
elsewhere. In other words, the mobilisation of ‘unrepresented masses’ and crisis of representation 
that is behind the founding moment of populism, though present, is less radical. Without a crisis of 
the dimension and depth as that of 2001 in Argentina, Lulism could navigate a moderate pace of 
reform for its variant of neopopulism.  
The end of PT’s cycle is also peculiar. For one side the enabling condition of the commodity 
boom is closing. However, the massive demonstrations of June 2013 that sparked with the issue of 
transport and those of 2015 from anti-PT organizations would also need to be accounted for. The 
recent impeachment of Dilma in 2016 and the blow to PT in the municipal elections, together with 
the ongoing political crisis seem to indicate that the party is no longer able to represent or effectively 
channel the social sectors it used to.  
In sum, even though Lulism and PT’s government have not been unanimously identified as 
populists, we have found that they too can be consistently thought as a case of Pink Tide 
neopopulism. Unlike Kirchnerism, the PT stems from a remarkable cycle of trade union and social 
movements resistance to neoliberalism. Trade unions and MST were precisely the mobilized sectors 
demanding representation (and redistribution), even when this was not explosive as in Argentina. The 
historical task of PT was to institutionalize, integrate, and demobilize these sectors and demands, in a 
context of economic growth that allowed the state to capture and redistribute new resources. The ‘low 
intensity’ of this populism, including the form of the appeals to an antagonistic discourse (Ab’Saber, 
2011) is mainly conditioned by the ‘low intensity’ of the crisis. The end of the cycle is however also 
following the closure of the exceptional cycle of its enabling condition, the commodity boom. 
Conclusions 
We have briefly revisited populism in Latin America and its interpretations with the attempt 
at rescuing recurring elements in this long and varied history of analyses that would allow for an 
interpretation of Pink Tide governments beyond the canon of discursive analysis. This article stressed 
that the widely recognized processes of institutionalization behind populist regimes reveal an implicit 
enabling condition: the ability of the state to capture and redistribute (new) resources. 
Even this modest introduction of political economy has proven to be helpful for a better 
understanding not only of populism’s emergence, but also of its demise. While our proposal is 
consistent with the longstanding agreement that populist regimes stem from crises of representation, 
it provides new hints on when a populist response to such a crisis is at all possible.  
We have thus explained the emergence of Kirchnerism and Lulism as responses to the crisis 
of neoliberalism. We have opted to use the term ‘Pink Tide neopopulism’ to distinguish them from 
classical postwar populism and from ‘neopopulism’ as neoliberal populism. The differences between 
both were traced in the nature of the mobilized subject, the enabling condition and the depth and type 
of the crisis. 
In rejoining the question of the structural conditions of populism it is important not to return 
to the history of determinism and functionalism that tainted the historical debate (and that lead to the 
reluctance to even reference this issue). An enabling condition is not a ‘fundamental cause’ of 
neopopulism (as in Weyland 2009) but rather the means that allow for the resolution of a crisis. The 
causes of populism stem from the crisis of neoliberalism (that preceded the boom), the existence of 
various 'unmet demands' and the availiability of rents. 
Pointing at the importance of crisis also serves as a key analytical issue. Fist, a common 
‘fluidity’ and the changing nature of the populist state are traits consistent with the weakness of a 
state that stems from a crisis. This sets right the contradiction in the widespread idea that populist 
states are ‘strong’ and that they are the product of a crisis. In rejoining Harvey’s (2005) definition of 
the neoliberal state as a strong state, not as a function of its regulatory power or interventionism but 
rather after its capacity to guarantee the reproduction of social relations and its command over the 
working class, one can regard the populist state as weak or ‘in a constant fluid state, given that [it] 
must constantly negotiate to overcome the gaps between […] rhetoric and socioeconomic reality’ 
(Leiva 2008). Second, the depth of the crisis accounts for the differences in their degrees of 
radicalism, a point that we used to explain some of the differences between Kirchnerismo and 
Lulismo.  
Another element of analysis has been the ‘historical task’ of populism, and we have 
identified a consensus around the institutionalization of social conflict and the reinstatement of the 
state as its mediator. The key actors of resistance to neoliberalism in each national case had a subset 
of their demands incorporated and they accepted a redefinition of resistance’s ‘legitimate’ practices 
(e.g. the repression of ‘tough piqueteros’ or the domestication of MST’s land grabbing through the 
legalization and regulation of credit and state support).  
By understanding the enabling conditions of populism we have also set out to explain the 
conditions of the demise of populism. As much as classical populism has been made impossible after 
the changes in the world market that made ISI a historical curiosity, the fate of Pink Tide 
neopopulism seem also to be tied to that of the commodity boom. 
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1 As noted by Ferreira (2001), this was not the case before the Second World War.  
2 For a broader overview of populism and the importance of modernization theories in its 
theorization, see the introduction to this volume. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
3 Note that this was intended as a complementary political thesis to the main modernization 
theory stemming from Latin American structuralism or cepalismo. In this sense populism could be, 
as much as underdevelopment, a key postcolonial experience. 
4 By ‘liberal oligarchic regime’ Weffort refers to the governments of 1880-1930 that 
denied working class participation and dealt with the ‘social question’ in a repressive way, had 
limited citizenship including voting rights, were politically conservative and combined this with a 
‘liberal approach to economics’, i.e. free trade/markets. 
5 It is fair to note that Weffort reconsidered the idea of manipulation in his later writings 
and renamed it ‘populist alliance’ (Ferreira, 2001). 
6 A post-impeachment issue of Exame (São Paulo), Bolivar Lamounier “Não precisamos 
de salvadores”, 25/5/2016. Similar statements are widely common, including, for instance F. H. 
Cardoso, lecture at OEA, 30/3/2006, for Argentina Luis Alberto Romero (Andes, 12/12/2014 and 
Clarín 9/4/2014), José Nun (La Nación, 19/12/2012). 
7  In other words, any state expenditure that challenges the orthodoxy of fiscal equilibrium 
targets. This definition of populism would overlap with that of Keynesianism or ECLAC 
structuralism. 
8 There is also potentially a relationship between redistribution and some definitions of the 
‘charismatic leader’, though its analysis is beyond the scope of this article.  
9 This is another aspect of the ‘institutionalization drive’ already mentioned above. This 
‘economic incorporation’ of social groups, complementary to the ‘political’ one, is at the antipodes of 
neoliberal approaches. While populism attempts a mode of mediation the neoliberal state leaves this 
to market mechanisms.  
10 This period was inaugurated by the coup d’etat of 1930 and characterized by electoral 
fraud, corruption and persecution of the working class and the political opposition, as well as by the 
interwar economic turmoil and the Great Depression.  
11 The Republica Velha (Old Republic) is the period from 1889 until the military coup of 
1930. It is generally acknowledged that democracy was nominal, with rigged elections, corruption 
among elites and the alternation of presidents between large landowners from São Paulo and Mina 
Gerais. 
12 The implicit reference is to the epitome of populist discourse, Vargas ‘testament’, another 
letter to the Brazilian people. 
13 Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra (Landless Worker’s Movement), one of the 
largest social movements in Latin America articulating resistance to neoliberalism. 
14 Speech to new ministers on 31 March 2010.  
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